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Abstract
While much of the literature on cross section dependence has fo-
cused mainly on estimation of the regression coe¢cients in the under-
lying model, estimation and inferences on the magnitude and strength
of spill-overs and interactions has been largely ignored. At the same
time, such inferences are important in many applications, not least
because they have structural interpretations and provide useful inter-
pretation and structural explanation for the strength of any interac-
tions. In this paper we propose GMM methods designed to uncover
underlying (hidden) interactions in social networks and committees.
Special attention is paid to the interval censored regression model.
Our methods are applied to a study of committee decision making
within the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee.
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1 Introduction
Various approaches have been proposed in the literature to address cross
section, or spatial, dependence. At the one end are multifactor approaches
which assume cross section dependence can be explained by a …nite num-
ber of unobserved common factors that a¤ect all units (regions, economic
agents, etc.). Estimation of panel data regression models under such factor
error structure has been addressed by maximum likelihood (Robertson and
Symons, 2000), principal component analysis (Coakley et al., 2002), or the
recently proposed common correlated e¤ects approach (Pesaran, 2006).
An alternative characterisation, originally developed in the regional sci-
ence and geography literatures, but with increasing economic applications,
is based on spatial weights matrices. The idea is that there are spillover
e¤ects across the economic agents because of spatial or other forms of local
cross section dependence. Panel data regression models with such spatially
correlated error structures have been estimated using maximum likelihood
techniques (Anselin, 1988), or generalized method of moments (Kapoor et
al., 2007; Kelejian and Prucha, 1999; Conley, 1999). Kelejian and Prucha
(2007) also extend the GMM methodology to nonparametric estimation of
a heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent cross section covariance
matrix, for applications where an instrumental variable procedure has been
used to estimate the regression coe¢cients.
However, the above two characterisations of cross section dependence are
not mutually exclusive. Factor models typically only provide a partial expa-
nation for cross section dependence, and therefore it is often observed that
residuals from estimated factor models display substantial cross section cor-
relation. Furthermore, Pesaran and Tosetti (2007) consider a panel data
model where both sources of cross section dependence exist and show that,
under certain restrictions on the nature of dependence, the common corre-
lated e¤ects approach (Pesaran, 2006) still works.
At the same time as spatial weights characterise cross section dependence
in useful ways, their measurement has a signi…cant e¤ect on the estimation of
a spatial dependence model (Anselin, 2002; Fingleton, 2003). Measurement
is typically based on underlying notions of distance between cross section
units. These di¤er widely across applications, depending not only on the
speci…c economic context but also on availability of data. Spatial contigu-
ity (resting upon implicit assumptions about contagious processes) using a
binary representation is a frequent choice. Further, in many applications,
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there are multiple possible choices and substantial uncertainty regarding the
appropriate choice of distance measures. However, while the existing litera-
ture contains an implicit acknowledgment of these problems, most empirical
studies treat spatial dependence in a super…cial manner assuming in‡exible
di¤usion processes in terms of known, …xed and arbitrary spatial weights
matrices (Giacomini and Granger, 2004). The problem of choosing spatial
weights becomes a key issue in many economic applications; apart from ge-
ographic distances, notions of economic distance (Conley, 1999; Pesaran et
al., 2004, Holly et al., 2008), socio-cultural distance (Conley and Topa, 2002;
Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler, 2005), and transportation costs and time
(Gibbons and Machin, 2005; Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler, 2005) have
been highlighted in the literature. The uncertainty regarding the choice of
metric space and location, closely related to the measurement of spatial
weights, have been addressed in the literature (Conley and Topa, 2002, 2003;
Conley and Molinari, 2007). Related issues regarding endogeneity of loca-
tions have also been addressed (Pinkse et al., 2002; Kelejian and Prucha,
2004; Pesaran and Tosetti, 2007).
While the above literature addressed cross section dependence in various
ways, it has focused mainly on estimation of the regression coe¢cients in the
underlying model, treating the cross section dependence as a nuisance pa-
rameter. Estimation and inferences on the magnitude and strength of spill-
overs and interactions has been largely ignored. However, there are many
instances in which inferences about the nature of the interaction is of inde-
pendent interest. Recent developments in the economics of networks (Goyal,
2007) suggest that the pattern of connections between individual rational
agents shapes their actions and determines their rewards. Understanding,
empirically, what the precise form of interaction is actually observed is an
important counterpart to the development of the theory of networks.
Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler (2005) consider estimation of a spatial
weights matrix in a spatial error model with spatial autoregressive errors.
They show that the estimation problem is only partially identi…ed, upto
the choice of an arbitrary orthogonal transformation of interactions. This
problem is related to identi…cation restrictions underlying the factor model
(Bonhomme and Robin, 2006) and simultaneous equation systems (Hausman
and Taylor, 1983; Hausman et al., 1987). Symmetry of the spatial weights
matrix constitutes one set of valid identifying restrictions.
However, such identifying restrictions may be too strong in some applica-
tions. In this paper, we develop a GMM based estimation methodology for
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spatial or interaction weights matrices1 which are unrestricted except for the
validity of the included instruments and other moment conditions. Further-
more, instrument validity can be tested in our framework, in addition to the
identi…cation restrictions required for the estimators proposed in Bhattachar-
jee and Jensen-Butler (2005). Speci…cally, we consider a setup where a given
set of cross section units have …xed but unrestricted interactions; these in-
teractions are inherently structural in that they are related to an underlying
structural economic model. Further, there exist a set of other cross section
units, correlated with the units under consideration, but which may change
over time, expand or even vanish. In fact, our estimation methodology,
motivated by GMM estimation of the dynamic panel data model (Arellano
and Bond, 1991; Blundell and Bond, 1998), uses these additional units to
constitute instruments.2 Additional instruments can be included under the
assumption of homoscedasticity. However, whereas the dynamic panel data
literature is largely based on …xed  large  asymptotics, our asymptotic
setting is di¤erent. We focus on estimating interactions between a …xed num-
ber of cross section units, and allow the number of time periods to increase
to in…nity. While our basic method is based on a multiple regression model
with spatial autoregressive errors, we also consider three extensions. In the
…rst, we extend our estimates to the censored regression model. Secondly, we
allow for unobserved common factors in addition to idiosyncratic errors with
spatial interactions. Finally, we consider a regression model with spatial au-
toregressive structure in the regressors in addition to cross section dependent
errors.
Our methods are applied to a study of committee decision making within
the Bank of England’s monetary policy committee (MPC). We consider a
monetary policy committee where personalities are important. In our model
of committee decision making, the personalities are re‡ected in heterogene-
ity in the policy reaction functions for the di¤erent members, as well as
in interactions among members that can be strategic or just a re‡ection of
1We prefer to use the term interaction rather than spatial since the latter term de-
notes some notion of physical proximity when there are many circumstances in which an
interaction takes place in a much broader sense.
2In our application later in the paper we consider interactions between a subset of the
members of the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. The membership
changes over time, so during the period that we study there are members joinnig and
leaving who provide instruments for the subset who remain on the Committee for the
whole of the period.
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likemindedness. We extend the work in Bhattacharjee and Holly (2009) by
considering heterogeneity in the beliefs about the e¤ects of interest rates on
output and in‡ation, in the private information of each committee member
and in their di¤ering views on uncertainty. Further, we allow for interaction
between the members of the committee. Our estimates suggest signi…cant
cross section interactions between members, both positive and negative.
2 Model and GMM estimators
We consider a panel data model with …xed e¤ects and unrestricted slope
heterogeneity
 =  + 
0
 + 
0
 +   = 1 2     ;  = 1 2      (1)
 () = 0; () = 
2
 ; ( ) = 0;
 () = 0  = 1 2     ;  6= 
Where  is an observation on the  cross section unit and  is a £1 vector
of observed individual speci…c regressors for the -th unit and  is a  £ 1
vector of common deterministic components.  are the individual-speci…c
(idiosyncratic) errors assumed to be independently distributed of  and .
Note that the regression errors are allowed to have arbitrary cross section
dependence, given that our main objective here is to provide estimates of the
interactions between the cross section units.
There are a variety of estimators in the literature for the regression co-
e¢cients of the above model; see, for example, Anselin (1988) and Anselin
et al. (2003) and references therein. In particular, in the case when  is
not large the SURE method allows for unrestricted correlations across cross
section units, and provides a simple way to test for slope heterogeneity in
the regression coe¢cients.
Our focus, however, is on modelling the network between the agents
1 2      ( …xed), and estimation of cross agent interactions. This is
a problem that has not received much attention in the literature. For this
purpose, we propose the model
1 = 122 + 133 +   + 1 + 1
2 = 211 + 233 +   + 2 + 2
...
 = 11 + 22 +   + (¡1)¡1 + 
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or, in compact form
 =  +  (2)
where  is a ( £ ) matrix of interaction weights with zero diagonal
elements and unrestricted entries on the o¤-diagonals. The only condition
that  needs to satisfy is that ( ¡ ) is non-singular, which is required for
identi…cation in the reduced form.
The interaction weights matrix  is related to the spatial weights ma-
trix popular in geography, regional sciences and in the spatial econometrics
literature. However, while that literature treats  as exogenous and known
a priori, at least approximately, our interpretation di¤ers. For us,  is a
matrix of interaction weights which is unknown and on which we conduct
inference. One way to motivate the framework is network theory (Dutta and
Jackson, 2003; Goyal, 2007), where the equilibrium network emerges through
interactions between agents.
We will propose GMM based estimators for these weights. Towards this
end, we consider …rst a somewhat analogous setup from the literature on the
standard dynamic panel data model, described as
 =  + ¡1 +   = 1 2      ;  = 1 2      (3)
 () = 0; () = 0; () = 0;
 () = 0  = 1 2     ;  6= 
Arellano and Bond (1991) considered GMM estimation of the above model
based on sequential moment conditions where lagged levels of the variable are
instruments for the endogenous …rst di¤erences. Under the initial condition
that
 (1) = 0  = 1 2     ;  = 2 3     
Arellano and Bond (1991) proposed the ( ¡ 1) ( ¡ 2) 2 linear moment
conditions

³

(¡2)
 4 
´
= 0  = 3      (4)
where (¡2)

= (1 2     ¡2).
Our context is di¤erent. We have lagged endogenous variables as regres-
sors, but the observations are not sampled at equi-spaced points on the time
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axis. Rather, the locations of our agents lie in a multi-dimensional, and pos-
sibly abstract, space without any clear notion of ordering or spacing between
observations. At the same time, one can often imagine that potential nonzero
interaction weights imply that 1 2      are regression errors from (1),
at time , on a collection of agents who are not located very far away in space.
In many applications, there may also be, potentially speci…c to the time pe-
riod, additional agents who are located further away (like those at higher lags
in the dynamic panel data model), who are correlated with the above set of
endogenous variables, but not with the idiosyncratic errors 1 2     
from the interaction error equation (2).
In social networks agents who have weak ties with other agents may act
as instruments for groups of agents that share strong ties (Granovetter, 1973,
Goyal, 2005) In panel data on cross-sections of countries or regions, such a
set may include other countries not included in the analysis either because of
irregular availability of data or because they are outside the purview of the
analysis. Similarly, in geography and regional studies, observations at a …ner
spatial scale may constitute such instruments. We denote such a collection
of instruments, speci…c to a particular time , by ()

=
³

(1)

 
(2)

     
()

´
,
and assume the
P

=1  moment conditions

³

()
 
´
= 0  = 1 2      ;  = 1 2      (5)
Given the nature of our problem,  is …xed. Our main focus is draw-
ing inferences on the spatial dynamics of the system, unlike the standard
dynamic panel data setting, where dynamics is along the time dimension.
Therefore, our asymptotic setting is one where  is large, as we accumulate
evidence on the …nite number of cross section interactions as the number of
time periods increase to in…nity. This is in direct correspondence with the
standard dynamic panel data model, where GMM inference is drawn as 
becomes large, while  is held …xed.
The validity of these potentially large number of instruments can be
checked using, for example, the Sargan -test. However, weak instruments
may also potentially provide a problem here. Similar to Arellano and Bond
(1991), and assuming a …rst order autoregressive structure in the errors of
the interactions model:
 =  +   = 1 2      ;  = 2 3     
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 () = 0  6= 
we have the additional  ( ¡ 1) linear moment conditions ( ¸ 2)

¡

(¡2)

¢
= 0  = 3      (6)
where (¡2) =
³

(¡2)
1  
(¡2)
2      
(¡2)

´
and (¡2) = (¡ ¡+1     ¡2)
for  = 1 2      .3
Furthermore, we can assume that the  disturbances are homoscedastic
over time (Ahn and Schmidt, 1995, and Blundell and Bond, 1998). In this
case, we have a further  ( + 1) moment conditions
 (¡2¡1 ¡ ¡1) = 0  = 1 2     ;  = ¡ ¡+1      (7)
For the model given in (1) and (2), we propose a three step estimation
procedure as follows. First, we estimate the underlying regression model
(1) using an optimisation based method such as maximum likelihood, least
squares or GMM, and collect residuals. Next, we estimate the interactions
error model (2) using a two-step GMM estimator. The weights matrix is
estimated using the outer product from moment conditions evaluated at an
initial consistent estimator, which is the GMM estimator using the identity
weighting matrix. The validity of multi-step procedures (consistency and
asymptotic normality) such as the one proposed here4 follow from Newey
(1984).5
3In the dynamic panel data literature, it is standard to use the full set of
 ( ¡ 1) ( ¡ 2) 2 linear moment conditions, with (¡2)

= (1 2     ¡2). How-
ever, since we have large  asymptotics here, it is not particularly useful to extend the set
of moment conditions beyond  lags, where  is a su¢ciently large number.
4Our methods are related to some alternative approaches taken in the literature. Bhat-
tacharjee and Jensen-Butler (2005) consider estimation of interaction weights in a frame-
work closely related to ours, and show that these weights are only partially identi…ed from
the unrestricted pattern of cross section dependence. Additional structural assumptions,
such as symmetry of the weights matrix, is required for explicit estimation of the weights
matrix. Bhattacharjee and Holly (2009b) apply the above method to interactions within
the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee, using an alternative set of identify-
ing structural restrictions. Admittedly, the above methodology requires strong, and often
unveri…able, structural assumptions, which is the main limitation that the current GMM
based approach seeks to address.
5The number of moment conditions in the methods proposed in this paper are poten-
tially large. Following Doran and Schmidt (2006), one can e¤ectively perform GMM on
a smaller set of moment conditions by considering only the leading principal components
of the weighting matrix. This is likely to improve small sample performance, though we
have not explored this at present.
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Pinkse et al. (2002) also consider a related problem where agents posi-
tion themselves in geographical and quality space strategically, and therefore
endogenously, but their relative positions are approximately given by a vec-
tor of distance measures. Their GMM methodology relies crucially on the
validity of the distance metrics, which are …xed a priori. Moreover, their
main focus is in estimating the underlying regression coe¢cients rather than
the strength (and direction) of the interactions: see also Pinkse and Slade
(2007). Similarly, Conley (1999) and Conley and Topa (2002) develop a
GMM based methodology to estimate the regression parameters of the un-
derlying model, where there is some uncertainty in the a priori speci…cation
of distance measures.
Our work is also related to the literature on networks. While theory
suggests that equilibrium network structures tend to have certain simple
forms (see, for example, Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996; Bala and Goyal, 2003;
Goyal and Vega-Redondo, 2007), our methods can be used to evaluate these
theories and to draw inferences on the form of networks in actual applications.
Next, we consider three extensions. The …rst is to a model where the
response variable is interval censored. Our second extension is to a model
(Pesaran and Tosetti, 2007) which includes unobserved factors in addition
to cross section dependence. Finally, we consider a model, similar to Pinkse
et al. (2002), where in addition to cross section dependence in the error
structure, we also have spatial autoregression in the underlying economic
model.
2.1 Interactions between censored residuals
Consider a DGP where the residuals from the underlying economic model are
interval censored:  2 [0 1]. Such censoring typically arises because the
dependent variable, , from the underlying economic model is itself either
interval censored or ordinal. Then, for a given cross section unit , we have
the following regression model in latent errors
 = e 0(¡)() + 
where e(¡) denotes the vector of residuals for the cross section units other
than , () is the -th row of  transposed (ignoring the diagonal ele-
ment, which is zero by construction), and observations run over  = 1      .
Henceforth, for simpler exposition, we omit the reference to subscripts  and
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. We discuss estimation of the (), an index row of  . The same procedure
is repeated for each cross section unit in turn, and the whole  matrix is
therefore estimated.
Then, the censored regression model in the regression errors is more sim-
ply written as
 = e 0 +  (8)
Observations : ([0 1]  e )
 ( 2 [0 1]) = 1
where e are endogenous regressors with instruments .
We further assume that
e = 0+ ; () = 0; (9)
 = 0 + ;  ?  ;  »  ¡0 2¢ 
An important special case when this holds is when  and  are jointly
normally distributed and independent of . However, in general, normal-
ity of  is not required. Further, the framework can be further generalised
where e =  () + , and the distribution of errors is unknown (Blundell and
Powell, 2004). In that case, estimation and inference requires kernel based
methods and appropriate measures of choice probabilities. For modelling the
choice probabilities, various options are available from the literature: purely
nonparametric kernel estimates, average structural functions (Blundell and
Powell, 2003) or index choice probabilities (Ichimura, 1993); see Blundell and
Powell (2003) for a review and discussion. For simplicity, we assume a linear
structure and normality of the instrument equation errors.
Substituting for , the interval inequalities corresponding to  ( 2 [0 1]) =
1 can be expressed as
0 = 1 (¡0 + e 0 + 0 +  ¸ 0) and (10)
1 = 1 (1 ¡ e 0 ¡ 0 ¡  ¸ 0) (11)
2.1.1 Exogenous censoring intervals
First, let us assume that the boundaries of the censoring intervals (0 and 1)
are exogenous. Exogeneity of the censoring interval is natural or otherwise
a plausible assumption, in many applications. For example, event studies
on …rms often focus on a …xed period of time, which then corresponds to
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an exogenously given interval in the age of the …rm or an exogenous inter-
val in duration since a treatment under study. Another example could be
study of exit, investment and acquisition decisions in …rms, where the un-
derlying model of Jovanovic and Rousseau (2002) posits four regions of …rm
e¢ciencies: the …rm exits at levels below a lower threshold, continues with-
out investment in the next, invests only in new capital at higher e¢ciencies,
and expands through organic growth and acquisitions at e¢ciencies above
a high threshold (see also Bhattacharjee et al., 2009). Other applications
would arise from data on longitudinal surveys, where economic agents are
observed over time, but typically only at …xed time points.
In the above case, ¡0 and 1 can be treated as regressors with posi-
tive unit coe¢cients and the control function approach (Blundell and Smith,
1986) can be applied. Extending Lewbel (2004), we …rst de…ne
0 (0 0 e    ) = 0  [(¡0 + e 0 + 0) ]
© [(¡0 + e 0 + 0) ]
+ (1¡0) ¡ [(¡0 + e 0 + 0) ]
1¡ © [(¡0 + e 0 + 0) ] , and
1 (1 1 e    ) = 1  [(1 ¡ e 0 ¡ 0) ]
© [(1 ¡ e 0 ¡ 0) ]
+ (1¡1) ¡ [(1 ¡ e 0 ¡ 0) ]
1¡ © [(1 ¡ e 0 ¡ 0) ] 
where  and © are the pdf and cdf of the standard normal distribution
respectively.
The following moment conditions can then be obtained:
 [ (e¡ 0)] = 0
 [0 (0 0 e (e¡ 0)    )e] = 0
 [0 (0 0 e (e¡ 0)    ) (e¡ 0)] = 0 (12)
 [0 (0 0 e (e¡ 0)    ) 0] = 0
 [1 (1 1 e (e¡ 0)    )e] = 0
 [1 (1 1 e (e¡ 0)    ) (e¡ 0)] = 0
 [1 (1 1 e (e¡ 0)    ) 1] = 0
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Here,  includes instruments ()

and (¡2) corresponding to moment con-
ditions (5) and (6) respectively; under homoscedasticity, additional moment
conditions corresponding to (7) may be included.
A GMM estimator based on the above moment conditions is simple to
implement. Typically, such a method based on control functions would be
applicable only if the endogenous variables are continuous (not limited de-
pendent); the assumption  () = 0 is typically violated otherwise.
2.1.2 Ordered choice with …xed intervals
Exogeneity of the censoring intervals may be a tenuous assumption. However,
in many applications, the intervals are …xed in repeated sampling. This
is often because the DGP allows measurement of the response in integer
intervals; for example, education or business longevity measured in years,
business cycle duration in quarters, income in thousands of currency units,
and so on. In this paper, we consider an application to monetary policy
decision making, where preferred changes are in multiples of 25 basis points.
In all of these examples, the underlying censoring scheme can be characterised
by a sequence of  + 1 intervals
 = [¡1 ]   = 1     + 1
where 0 and +1 may take …nite values, or may be set to ¡1 and 1
respectively, and the intervals may be considered as open or closed at either
threshold depending on the application. In this setup, interval censored data
is equivalent to observing a sequence of discrete decision functions  and
the resulting discrete choice variable , where
 = 1 ( + e 0 +  ¸ 0) ;
 =
X
=1
 2 f0 1 2    g  (13)
This is a variant of the usual ordered choice model, with the di¤erence that
the interval boundaries are …xed by design and are therefore not required
to be estimated. Although the underlying censoring intervals of the latent
response variable here clearly depends on e, the censoring scheme itself is
exogenous. Lewbel (2000) has developed estimates of the ordered choice
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model in the case when one of the regressors is “very exogenous”.6 This may
be a strong assumption in many cases, and particularly in the context of our
application to monetary policy decision making.7
Nevertheless, we may cast the censored regression problem as one where
 decision functions are sequentially evaluated for each individual. The
interval corresponding to each single decision is …xed a priori, in a way that
is independent of the regression error . Following Blundell and Smith (1986)
and Lewbel (2004), we set up the problem as in (9) earlier. Then we obtain
the moment conditions:
 [ (e¡ 0)] = 0
 [0 (1¡1 e (e¡ 0)    )] = 0
 [0 (1¡1 e (e¡ 0)    ) e] = 0
 [0 (1¡1 e (e¡ 0)    ) (e¡ 0)] = 0
 [0 (1¡1 e (e¡ 0)    )1] = 0 (14)
...
...
 [0 (¡ e (e¡ 0)    )] = 0
 [0 (¡ e (e¡ 0)    ) e] = 0
 [0 (¡ e (e¡ 0)    ) (e¡ 0)] = 0
 [0 (¡  e (e¡ 0)    )] = 0
The instruments  are de…ned as before, based on our moment conditions
(5), (6) and (7).
6Intuitively, a “very exogenous regressor” has three properties. First, it is a regressor
in the latent variable model and has coe¢cient unity. Second, conditional on all other
endogenous, exogenous and instrumental variables in the model for the regression errors
(8), it is independent of the error term . Third, it has a support large enough to coun-
terbalance the e¤ect of other regressors and the errror. The second condition is similar to
exogeneity but stronger – exogeneity requires conditioning only on the exogenous variables
in the model. The regressor must also take both positive and negative values, which is
easily achieved by location shifts.
7Speci…cally, while preferred changes are observed in multiples of 25 basis points, the
assignment of these values to certain intervals is somewhat subjective, and dependent on
the pattern of the data. For example, in our application, we assign a larger interval to
the status quo position of “no change”, partly to re‡ect the preference for stable interest
rates.
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There are two important observations to note. First, all the  individual
decisions are applied to each individual. Second, as discussed earlier, the
choice of endogenous variables is somewhat limited in this approach. This is
particularly important for our application where the endogenous regressors
are also interval censored.
We address this problem using an error in variables approach. Speci…cally,
we explicitly model the DGP of the endogenous variables and replace the
censored observations with estimates of their expectations conditional on
their censoring interval. This way, the measurement errors are mean zero and
the error in variables problem here is in no way di¤erent from that addressed
in the standard instrumental variables literature; see, for example, Wansbeek
and Meijer (2001). The e¤ectiveness and validity of these instruments are
empirical issues speci…c to each individual application, and can be judged in
standard ways within the proposed GMM framework.
A potentially more powerful nonparametric approach to instrumental
variables estimation of the censored regression model, under the conditional
median assumption (j) has been proposed by Hong and Tamer
(2003). We do not adopt this approach for two reasons. First, estimation is
dependent on kernel estimators potentially in high dimensions which is not
very convenient. Second, the GMM based approach proposed here can be
easily combined with other maximum likelihood, or least squares, or method
of moments estimation procedures to obtain e¢cient two stage or three stage
estimators (Newey, 1984). This is particularly useful in the application con-
sidered in this paper.
2.2 Estimation in the presence of unobserved factors
Pesaran and Tosetti (2007) consider a model where, in addition to spatial
or network interactions described by a weights matrix, there are unobserved
common factors. Their estimation is based on the common correlated fac-
tors approach (Pesaran, 2006) where, in addition to the usual regressors,
linear combinations of unobserved factors are approximated by cross section
averages of the dependent and explanatory variables. De…ning notions on
weak and strong cross section dependence, Pesaran and Tosetti (2007) show
that the common correlated factors approach provides consistent estimates
of the slope coe¢cient under both forms of dependence. Our interest here is,
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however, on inference on network interactions in the model:
 =  + 
0
 + 
0
 + 
()
  + 
()0
  +  (15)
 =  +   = 1 2     
where our original underlying model (1) is simply augmented with cross sec-
tion averages of  and  ( and  respectively).
While inference in Pesaran and Tosetti (2007) assumes certain structural
constraints on the weights matrix, our network interactions are unrestricted
except for the identifying assumption that the matrix ( ¡ ) is nonsingu-
lar. Instead, we achieve identi…cation through the moment conditions given
in (5), (6) and (7). Under these moment conditions, GMM estimation is
straightforward.
As before, in the case when responses are interval censored, we can pro-
ceed by assuming either that the censoring intervals are exogenous, or that
our ordered choices are made over …xed intervals. In the former case, we use
the moment conditions (12) or (14) in the latter.
Thus, our model and methods can easily accommodate unobserved factors
in addition to cross section dependence, and the network interactions are
practically unrestricted. The implications of this weaker assumption on the
weights matrix, as compared with Pesaran and Tosetti (2007), is a matter
for further study.
2.3 Spatial autoregressive model with spatial autore-
gressive errors
Case (1991) and Pinkse et al. (2002), among others, have considered models
where there is spatial dynamics in the response variable, in addition to spatial
dependence in the errors. Speci…cally, we consider a model
 =  +1 + + 
0
 +   = 1 2      (16)
where  and  are £1 vectors, and  is a £ matrix of regressors, and
 is the  £ 1 vector (1 2      )0 of …xed e¤ects, and  is a £ 1 vector
of observed common factors. While cross section dynamics in  is described
by the weights matrix 1, dependence in the errors is given by
 = 2 +  (17)
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where 2 is a di¤erent matrix of cross section or network interactions. Our
objective is to estimate both 1 and 2.
Moment conditions corresponding to the errors are as described earlier
in (5), (6) and (7). Analogous to the model for , we can develop moment
conditions for dynamics in . Speci…cally, the moment conditions based on
spatial time lags of  can be given by

³

()


´
= 0 
()

=
³

(1)

 
(2)

     
()

´
; and (18)

¡

(¡2)

¢
= 0 (¡2) =
³

(¡2)
1  
(¡2)
2      
(¡2)

´
 (19)

(¡2)

= (1 2     ¡2)   = 3     
We propose a sequential GMM estimation strategy, …rst estimating (16)
under moment conditions (18) and (19), collecting residuals, and then using
the residuals to estimate (17) under moment conditions (5), (6) and (7).
Validity of this sequential method follows from Newey (1984).
Estimation of a similar model with unobserved factors, given by
 =  +1 + + 
0
 + 
0
() +   = 1 2      (20)
and (17) follows along exactly similar lines. Note that the unobserved factor
model in this case includes only cross sectional averages of , since spatial
lags of the response variable are already included in the RHS.
In the case where responses are interval censored, the inclusion of common
factors can have a special advantage. Since endogeneity in our framework is in
the nature of cross section or network dependence, the above approximation
for correlated factors have the advantage of averaging out these cross section
interactions. Therefore, the assumption of “very exogenous regressors” is
more plausible here. Following Lewbel (2000), we outline below the moment
conditions required for implementation of a GMM estimation procedure, un-
der the assumption of ordered choice with …xed intervals. However, while
Lewbel (2000) uses a nonparametric estimator for the conditional density of
the “very exogenous regressor” given other regressors and instruments, we
follow Lewbel (2004) in assuming a linear dependence structure and normal
errors. Therefore, we assume the model:
 = (01 
0)0 ;  =  0 +  (21)
 ?  ; »  ¡0 2¢ 
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where the cross section averaged regressor  is assumed to be scalar (for
simplicity) and “very exogenous” (which is ensured by the (21) conditions),
1 denotes the collection of all other regressors (comprising endogenous spa-
tial lags of the dependent variable, observed common factors and censoring
thresholds), and  denotes instruments ()

and (¡2). Analogous to (13), we
have a sequence of discrete decision functions  and the resulting discrete
choice variable , where
 = 1
µ

()
+
1
()

0
11 + +
1
()
 ¸ 0
¶
;
 =
X
=1
 2 f0 1 2    g  (22)
Note that the coe¢cient on the “very exogenous regressor”  is scaled to
unity. This, however, is not a constraint, since the threshold  is included
as one of the regressors, and the proper scale can be recovered from its
coe¢cient ¤ = 1
()
. Then, using Theorem 1 of Lewbel (2000) and the
model (21), we obtain the following moment conditions:
 [ (¡  0)] = 0

h

2
 ¡ (¡ 0)2
i
= 0

"

(
[1 ¡ 1 ( ¸ 0)] (22)¡12 exp
h
(¡0)2
22
i
¡¤ (1 + 011)
)#
= 0 (23)
...
...

"

(
[ ¡ 1 ( ¸ 0)] (22)¡12 exp
h
(¡0)2
22
i
¡¤ ( + 011)
)#
= 0
As earlier, estimation under the above moment conditions is standard.
The advantage of being able to use almost any kind of instruments comes at
the cost of the stronger assumption of “very exogenous regressor”. Because
of the structure of the problem here, all the parameters are free and recov-
erable, including the coe¢cient on  and the error variance 2. Further, in
principle, multiple “very exogenous regressors” may be available. This has
the potential advantage of enhancing e¢ciency of the estimation procedure.
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In this case, however, tail assumptions as in Magnac and Maurin (2008) will
be required. Once the main model (20) has been estimated, the residuals are
used to estimate the interaction model (17) for the errors using moment con-
ditions (12) or (14). Finally, moment conditions for both the main model (20)
and the model (17) for the errors can be combined together for joint GMM
estimation. This implies using a much larger set of moment conditions than
the sequential approach, which we prefer.
2.4 Inferring on network structure
The GMM estimation framework adopted in this paper relies crucially on the
validity and adequacy of the assumed moment conditions. The issues related
to this are well understood in the literature; see, for example, Hall (2004).
Throughout our empirical exercise, we test for overidentifying restrictions
using the standard Sargan-Hansen -statistic (Hansen, 1982).
The more interesting tests in our setup relate to network structure. To
emphasize, our main assumptin in this paper is that interactions in social
networks and committees are endogenous outcomes of strategic behaviour
of agents. This is in sharp contrast to the view in the spatial economet-
rics literature where interaction weights are …xed by design, known at least
approximately, and have no special informational content beyond account-
ing for cross section dependence in the underlying economic model. We,
however, conduct inference on the weights matrix speci…cally to understand
the strength (and nature) of interactions, and to study the pattern of links
evolving from network interactions by economic agents.
Recent literature on network theory (see, for example, Goyal (2005, 2007),
Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) and references therein) point to a variety
of equilibrium network structures arising from rational agents’ bargaining
strategies, and crucially depend on payo¤s and incentives. Theory suggests
that certain simple network architectures, such as a star or a cycle, may
emerge as equilibrium solutions, while structures such as hybrid cycle-star
may be less stable. Further, there are important roles for asymmetric net-
works.
In our framework, evaluating that the network structure has a particular
simple architecture reduces to testing for simple parameter restrictions in
the interaction weights. Various tests have been proposed within the GMM
framework, and issues relating to testing are well understood; see, among oth-
ers, Newey and West (1987), Bond et al. (2001), Hall (2004) and Kleibergen
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(2007). We suggest the LR type test for the purpose of evaluating network
structures and use this in our analysis.
3 Application
We develop the methodological approach described above in the context of
a particular form of interaction. In this case it is the decisions that a Com-
mittee makes on interest rates for the conduct of monetary policy.
4 A Model of a MPC
A standard way of understanding how a committee comes to a decision is that
each member reacts independently to a ‘signal’ coming from the economy and
makes an appropriate decision in the light of this signal and the particular
preferences/expertise of the member. A voting method then generates a
decision that is implemented. In practice there is also various forms of cross
committee dependence. Before a decision is made there is a shared discussion
of the state of the world as seen by each of the members. In this section we
model the possible interactions between members of a committee as one in
which interaction occurs in the form of deliberation. Views are exchanged
about the interpretation of signals and an individual member may decide to
revise his view depending upon how much weight he places on his own and
the views of others.
This process can be cast as a simple signal extraction problem within a
highly stylised framework. Let the -th MPC member formulate an (unbi-
ased) estimate of, say, the output gap,  . We adopt this notation here since
we wish to consider situations where  = 1  members could be a subset of
a Committee of  members. Then the underlying model for the  member
is:


 =  

+

 with 

 v (0 2) and 
¡



¢
=  

 =  for  = 1 
(24)
The internal process of deliberation between the members of the Com-
mittee reveals to everyone individual views of the output gap brought to the
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meeting8. The -th member then optimally combines his estimate with the
estimates of the others, attaching a weight to each. This weight depends on
the -th member’s (subjective) evaluation of the usefulness of the forecasts
of others. For example the -th member’s view of the (unbiased) estimate of
the output gap of the -th member is:


 =  + 

 with 

 v (0 2) for  = 1  (25)
A di¤use prior, 2

, in the bayesian sense, suggests little con…dence in the
forecast of the -th member’s estimate relative to the estimate of the -th
member himself and the estimates of the rest of the committee. The updated
(and optimal in the mean squared error sense) estimate of the output gap
for the -th member is then a weighted average (with the weights summing
to one) of the  members.


 = w
0
y for  = 1  (26)
where y is a  £ 1 vector of estimates of  and w is a  £ 1 vector of
weights (that sum to one) given by9:
w= e0S¡1

e0S¡1

e for  = 1 
Here, e is a £ 1 unit vector and S is de…ned as the matrix:
S =
26666664
211 12   1
21 
2
22 
  
 

1   
2

37777775  for  = 1 
The weights that members attach to the estimate of the output gap
can in principle be negative if there is a su¢ciently large negative covari-
ance, or larger than one if there is a large positive covariance. Delibera-
tion then implies a revised 1 £  vector of estimates of the output gap:
8Austin-Smith and Banks (1996) point out that we need each committee member to
be open in revealing his estimate of the output gap and sincere in casting a vote for an
interest rate decision that corresponds to the infomation available. Although we consider
only the one period problem here, in a multi-period context we assume that reputational
considerations are su¢ciently powerful to ensure fair play.
9This is of course the standard formula for the optimal combination of linear signals and
was …rst introduced into economics by Bates and Granger (1969) as a way of combining
forecasts.
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y = (
1
  
2
  

 )
0. This vector in turn maps into an interest decision
through:
 = j +
1
2
(+1j ¡ ¤) + 1
2


j +  for  = 1  (27)
where ¤ is the in‡ation target, +1j the forecast of in‡ation at time period
+1 based on information available in period , and likewise for j and 

j,
and the subscript j indicates that current realisations of the output gap
and in‡ation may well be imperfectly observed, and need to be forecasted.10
Therefore, the 1£  vector, i of decisions about the setting of the interest
rate is a linear mapping from y to i. The actual interest setting is then the
median of i, (i).
The revised estimate of the output gap after the initial stage of delib-
eration could be subject to further revision if there is an opportunity for
members to inform the rest of the committee of the change in their views.
This would in turn involve a revision of the vector of estimates to re‡ect
the new information that has been revealed by further deliberation. Iter-
atively, a stage would be reached when no further changes would be made
to the estimate of the -th member. However, in this case under reasonable
assumptions this will converge to a position in which all members have the
same belief about the output gap.11 To show this the interaction matrix –
obtained by stacking the row matrices of optimal weights – is:
W =
26664
11 12    1
21 22    2
...
...
. . .
...
1 2    
37775 (28)
and if y is a £ 1 vector of estimates of  with which each member of the
Committee enters the meeting, then after deliberation we have
y+1 =Wy

 (29)
10The derivation of the above in‡ation ‘feed forward’ rule (27) is based on Svensson
(1997), where the policymaker only targets in‡ation, and the central bank can (in expec-
tation) use the current interest rate to hit the target for in‡ation two periods hence; for
further details, see Bhattacharjee and Holly (2009a and 2009b).
11Instead we assume that there is only a single revision to the estimate of the output
gap as a result of deliberation.
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where y+1 is a 1 £  vector of revised estimates of the output gap after
deliberation.
4.1 Interactions among members of the Committee
Covariances between forecast errors imply interactions between members over
and above the sharing during deliberation of individual estimates of the out-
put gap.12 One form of interaction may involve strategic voting by a sub-
group of the Committee seeking to in‡uence the interest rate decision.13
However, it is well known that when the median is used to determine an
outcome it will be invariant to attempts to act strategically.
However, it is possible that there are commonalities among members of
a committee that can be thought of as a form of likemindedness. Some
members share a common background or experiences and happen to share
a common view of the world. In this case there will be positive covariances
between the forecast errors of groups of members who share common views.
Similarly, there may be con‡icts between preferences of other members. The
current literature on political economy emphasizes several channels through
which signi…cant interactions may arise; see Gerling et al. (2005) for further
discussion..
Grüner and Kiel (2004) analyze collective decision problems in which
individual bliss points are correlated but not identical. Like our setup here,
all agents obtain private information about their most desired policy, but the
individually preferred decision of a group member does not only depend on
his own private information but also on the other group members’ private
information. They …nd that for weak interdependencies, the equilibrium
strategy under the median mechanism is close to truth-telling whereas the
mean mechanism leads to strong exaggeration of private information. This is
similar to our arguments here. However, in a setting with interdependencies,
pre-vote communication may a¤ect equilibrium behaviour - an issue not yet
addressed clearly in the literature. Our analysis in this paper suggests that
limits to information sharing (only a single revision in our case) may re‡ect
interdependencies, both positive and negative, in the …nal votes though not
necessarily in the median outcome.
12The pooling of information avoids any of the complications that arise in Townsend’s
(1983) model of ‘forecasting the forecasts of others’.
13As before we assume openness and sincerity in providing information about what the
output is.
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Matsen and Røisland (2005) highlight the fact that members of a Com-
mittee may represent di¤erent constituents (countries or regions, sectors etc.)
with potentially di¤erent e¤ects of interest rate changes. Such asymmetric
shocks and transmission mechanisms can induce corresponding members to
engage in strategic voting. In this case, there may be positive or negative
interactions originating from unobserved factors which are speci…c to sub-
groups within the Committee. This is similar to the likemindedness view
discussed above.
Li et al. (2001) analyse small-committee decisions when members have
partially con‡icting interests and possess private information, but preferences
are common knowledge. Their main …nding is that information cannot be
fully shared and voting procedures arise as the equilibrium method of in-
formation aggregation. Further, in a recent contribution, Felgenhauer and
Grüner (2008) show that transparency in publishing voting behaviour may
have unintended consequences in settings where external in‡uence is high.
Speci…cally, bene…ts from strategic voting increase in this case, not only for
the pivotal voters, but also extreme hawks or doves.
Recent literature on endogenous network formation also point to impor-
tant roles for strategic information sharing and links (Goyal, 2007). First,
transmission of information may be unidirectional or bidirectional. Gra-
novetter (1973) interprets unidirectional transmission as a weak link and
bidirectional as a strong link. Second, quality of links may vary quite a lot,
and network formation endogenously depends on the quality (Goyal, 2005).
Third, certain forms of network architecture often emerge as equilibrium
solutions, while others are not stable. For example, a periphery-sponsored
star is a Nash equilibrium in Goyal (2005), while under capacity constraints
Goyal and Vega-Redondo (2007) …nd a cycle network more meaningful. In
the context of interactions between Committee members, this suggests two
important aspects. First, a network where all members try hard to obtain
private information from others is often not an equilibrium solution. Sec-
ond, the architecture of networks which emerges in equilibrium is useful for
understanding the nature of information aggregation and constraints. Our
framework for inference on cross member interactions within the MPC will
inform both these aspects.
Finally, within a MPC setting, Sibert (2002, 2003) points to the impor-
tant role for reputational e¤ects and strategic behaviour. Speci…cally, she
shows that behaviour of new members may be di¤erent from veterans, and
this di¤erence can depend on the balance of power and size of the com-
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mittee. Since, under transparency, voting behaviour is the main signal for
reputational e¤ects, this line of research also has potential implications for
our model of MPC interactions.
5 Data and Empirical Model
In the previous section we presented a model of committee decision mak-
ing based on an in‡ation forecast rule and accommodating heterogeneity
across policy makers and interaction between their individual decisions. In
this section we turn to an empirical examination of decision making within
the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England. In the following
subsections, we present our data and the empirical model, and discuss the
econometric methods used to estimate the model.
5.1 Data and sample period
The primary objectives of the empirical study is to understand cross mem-
ber interaction in decision making at the Bank of England’s MPC, within
the context of the model of committee decision making presented in the pre-
vious section. Importantly, our framework allows for heterogeneity among
the MPC members and the limited dependent nature of preferred interest
rate decisions. Our dependent variables are the decisions of the individual
members of the MPC. The source for these data are the minutes of the MPC
meetings.
TABLE 1: Voting records of selected MPC members
Member Meetings Votes Dissent
Lower No change Raise Total High Low
Buiter 36 10 10 16 17 9 8
Clementi 63 14 39 10 4 3 1
George 74 15 51 6 0 0 0
Julius 45 18 25 2 14 0 14
King 85 14 50 21 12 12 0
Since mid-1997, when data on the votes of individual members started
being made publicly available, the MPC has met once a month to decide on
the base rate for the next month.14 Over most of this period, the MPC has
14The MPC met twice in September 2001. The special meeting was called after the
events of 09/11.
24
had 9 members at any time: the Governor (of the Bank of England), 4 inter-
nal members (senior sta¤ at the Bank of England) and 4 external members.
External members were usually appointed for a period ranging from 3 to 4
years. Because of changes in the external members, the composition of the
MPC has changed reasonably frequently. To facilitate study of heterogeneity
and interaction within the MPC, we focus on 5 selected members, including
the Governor, 2 internal and 2 external members. The longest such period
when the same 5 members have concurrently served in the MPC is the 33
month period from September 1997 to May 2000. The 5 MPC members who
served during this period are: George (the Governor), Clementi and King
(the 2 internal members) and Buiter and Julius (the 2 external members).
The voting pattern of these selected MPC members suggest substantial vari-
ation (Table 1).15
In order to explain the observed votes of the 5 selected members, we col-
lected information on the kinds of data that the MPC looked at for each
monthly meeting. The important issue was to ensure that we conditioned
only on what information was actually available at the time of each meet-
ing. Assessing monetary policy decisions in the presence of uncertainty about
forecast levels of in‡ation and the output gap (including uncertainty both in
forecast output levels and perception about potential output) requires col-
lection of real-time data available to the policymakers when interest rate
decisions are made as well as measures of forecast uncertainty. This con-
trasts with many studies of monetary policy which are based on realised
(and subsequently revised) measures of economic activity (see Orphanides,
2003).
We collected information on unemployment (where this typically refers
to unemployment three months prior to the MPC meeting), as well data
on the underlying state of asset markets (housing prices, share prices and
exchange rates). We measure unemployment by the year-on-year change
in International Labor Organization (ILO) rate of unemployment, lagged
3 months. The ILO rate of unemployment is computed using 3 months
rolling average estimates of the number of ILO-unemployed persons and size
15For example, of the 45 meetings which Julius attended, the votes for 14 were against
the consensus decision, and all of these were for a lower interest rate. On the other hand,
King disagreed with the consensus decision in 12 of the 82 meetings he attended, voting
for a higher interest rate each time. Buiter dissented in 17 meetings out of 36, voting on
8 occasions for a lower interest rate and 9 times in favour of a higher one. See also King
(2002) and Gerlach-Kristen (2004).
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of labour force (ILO de…nition), both collected from the O¢ce of National
Statistics (ONS) Labour Force Survey. Housing prices are measured by the
year-on-year growth rates of the Nationwide housing prices index (seasonally
adjusted) for the previous month (Source: Nationwide). Share prices and
exchange rates are measured by the year-on-year growth rate of the FTSE
100 share index and the e¤ective exchange rate respectively at the end of the
previous month (Source: Bank of England). The other current information
included in the model is the current level of in‡ation – measured by the
year-on-year growth rate of RPIX in‡ation lagged 2 months (Source: ONS).
Our model also includes expected rates of future in‡ation and forecasts of
current and future output. One di¢culty with using the Bank’s forecasts of
in‡ation is that they are not su¢ciently informative. By de…nition, the Bank
targets in‡ation over a two year horizon, so it always publishes a forecast
in which (in expectation) in‡ation hits the target in two years time. To
do anything else would be internally inconsistent. Instead, as a measure
of future in‡ation, we use the 4 year ahead in‡ation expectations implicit
in bond markets at the time of the MPC meeting, data on which can be
inferred from the Bank of England’s forward yield curve estimates obtained
from index linked bonds.16 For current output, we use annual growth of 2-
month-lagged monthly GDP published by the National Institute of Economic
and Social Research (NIESR) and for one-year-ahead forecast GDP growth,
we use the Bank of England’s model based mean quarterly forecasts.
Finally, uncertainty in future macroeconomic environment and private
perceptions about the importance of such uncertainty plays an important
role in the model developed in this paper. The extent to which there is
uncertainty about the forecast of the Bank of England can be inferred from
the fan charts published in the In‡ation Report. As a measure of uncertainty
in the future macroeconomic environment, we use the standard deviation of
the one-year-ahead forecast. These measures are obtained from the Bank of
England’s fan charts of output; details regarding these measures are discussed
elsewhere (Britton et al., 1998).
16We use the four year expected in‡ation …gure because the two year …gure is not
available for the entire sample period. In practice the in‡ation yield curve tends to be
very ‡at after two years.
26
5.2 The empirical model
We start with the model of individual voting behaviour within the MPC
developed in the previous section (27). The model includes individual speci…c
heterogeneity in the …xed e¤ects, in the coe¢cients of in‡ation and output
gap, and in the e¤ect of uncertainty. We aim to estimate this model in a
form where the dependent variable is the -th member’s preferred change
in the (base) interest rate. In other words, our dependent variable, ,
represents the deviation of the preferred interest rate for the -th member
(at the meeting in month ) from the current (base) rate of interest ¡1:
 =  ¡ ¡1
Therefore, we estimate the following empirical model of individual deci-
sion making within the MPC:
 =  + 
()
 4¡1 + (0)  + (4) +4j + (0) j (30)
+
(1)

+1j + 
()


¡
+1j
¢
+ 


 + 
where  represents current observations on unemployment (4) and the
underlying state of asset markets: housing, equity and the foreign exchange
market (,  and  respectively). This is combined with a
model for interaction between the error terms for di¤erent members
 =  +  (31)
where  is a ( £ ) matrix of interaction weights with zero diagonal
elements and unrestricted entries on the o¤-diagonals, such that ( ¡ ) is
non-singular. Standard deviation of the one-year ahead forecast of output
growth is denoted by 
¡
+1j
¢
; this term is included to incorporate the
notion that the stance of monetary policy may depend on the uncertainty
relating to forecast future levels of output and in‡ation. As discussed in
the previous section, increased uncertainty about the current state of the
economy will tend to bias policy towards caution in changing interest rates.
In particular, this strand of the literature suggests that optimal monetary
policy may be more cautious (rather than activist) under greater uncertainty
in the forecast or real-time estimates of output gap and in‡ation (see Issing,
2002; Aoki, 2003; and Orphanides, 2003). Since, as previously discussed,
the published in‡ation forecast is not su¢ciently informative, we con…ned
ourselves to uncertainty relating to forecasts of future output growth.
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However, there are two important additional features of our data gen-
erating process that render the estimation exercise nonstandard. First, the
dependent variable is observed in the form of votes, which are highly clustered
interval censored outcomes based on the underlying decision rules. Second,
the regression errors are interrelated across the members.
5.2.1 Interval censored votes
Votes of MPC members are highly clustered, with a majority of the votes
proposing no change in the base rate. The …nal decisions on interest rate
changes are all similarly clustered. For the Bank of England’s MPC as a
whole over the period June 1997 to March 2005, 69 per cent of the meetings
decided to keep the base rate at its current level, 14 per cent recommended
a rise of 25 basis points, 13 per cent recommended a reduction of 25 basis
points, and 4 per cent a reduction of 50 basis points.
This clustering has to be taken into account when studying individual
votes and committee decisions of the MPC. We do not observe changes in in-
terest rates on a continuous or unrestricted scale, we have a non-continuous
or limited dependent variable. Moreover, changes in interest rates are in
multiples of 25 basis points. Therefore, following Bhattacharjee and Holly
(2009a), we use an interval regression framework for analysis; other authors
have used other limited dependent variable frameworks, like the logit/ probit
or multinomial logit/ probit framework to analyse monetary policy decisions.
Our choice of model is based on the need to use all the information that is
available when monetary policy decisions are made, as well as problems re-
lating to model speci…cation and interpretation of multinomial logit models
(Greene, 1993). We also explored an ordered and multinomial logit formula-
tions, and found the broad empirical conclusions to be similar.
Therefore, the observed dependent variable in our case, , is the trun-
cated version of the latent policy response variable of the -th member, ,
which we model as
 = ¡025 if  2 [¡0375¡020)
= 0 if  2 [¡020 020] (32)
= 025 if  2 (020 0375]  and
 2 ( ¡ 0125  + 0125] whenever jj  0325
The wider truncation interval when there is a vote for no change in interest
rates (ie., for  = 0) may be interpreted as re‡ecting the conservative
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stance of monetary policy under uncertainty with a bias in favour of leaving
interest rates unchanged.
5.2.2 Estimation
Under the maintained assumptions that (a) regression errors are uncorrelated
across meetings, and (b) the response variable is interval censored, estima-
tion of the policy reaction function for each member (30) is an application
of interval regression (Amemiya, 1973). In our case, however, we have an
additional feature that the errors are potentially correlated across members.
If we can estimate the covariance matrix of these residuals, then we can use
a standard GLS procedure by transforming both the dependent variable and
the regressors by premultiplying with the symmetric square root of this co-
variance matrix. However, the dependent variable is interval censored and
has to be placed at its conditional expectation given current parameter es-
timates and its censoring interval. This sets the stage for the next round
of iteration. Now, the dependent variable is no longer censored; hence, a
standard SURE methodology can be applied.
Estimating the covariance matrix at the outset is also nonstandard. Be-
cause the response variable is interval censored the residuals also exhibit
similar limited dependence.17 We propose estimation using the Expectation-
Maximisation algorithm (Dempster et al., 1977; McLachlan and Krishnan,
1997). At the outset, we estimate the model using standard interval esti-
mation separately for each member and collect residuals. We invoke the
Expectation step of the EM algorithm and obtain expected values of the
residuals given that they lie in the respective intervals. Since we focus on
…ve MPC members, for each monthly meeting, we have to obtain conditional
expectations by integrating the pdf of the 5-variate normal distribution with
the given estimated covariance matrix.
Iterating the above method till convergence provides us maximum likeli-
hood estimates of the policy reaction function for each of the …ve members,
17For example, suppose the observed response for the -th member in a given month
 is 025. By our assumed censoring mechanism (32), this response is assigned to the
interval (020 0375]. Suppose also that the linear prediction of the policy response,
based on estimates of the interval regression model is b = 022. Then the resid-
ual  ¡ b cannot be assigned a single numerical value, but can be assigned to the
interval (020 ¡ 022 0375 ¡ 022]. In other words, the residual is interval censored:
 ¡ b 2 (¡002 0155].
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under standard assumptions, speci…cally multivariate normality of the cross
member errors. The covariance matrix of the errors is unrestricted.
Once the above model is estimated, we obtain interval censored residuals
using the initial censoring scheme. These are also placed at their expected
values, conditional on estimates of the model parameters and their own cen-
soring interval. Similarly, policy reaction functions are estimated for other
(¡) members who were in the committee in each month under study, for
use as instruments. These are also placed at their conditional expected val-
ues. The stage is now set for estimating the matrix of cross member network
interactions. This is achieved by GMM, assuming that the censoring inter-
vals are exogenous in the interaction model for the errors, and using moment
conditions given in (12). We do not impose homoscedasticity conditions on
the idiosyncratic errors in (31) and do not use the corresponding moment
condition (7). The validity of the assumed moment conditions is checked us-
ing the Sargan-Hansen -test for overidentifying restrictions (Hansen, 1982).
This completes a description of our estimation procedure.
For inference on network structures, we follow a similar procedure under
parameter restrictions implied by the network architecture. This is imple-
mented in the same way as above. Testing is conducted using the LR type
procedure (Newey and West, 1987; also discussed in Hall, 2004).
6 Results
We present estimates only for the network interactions in our model for the
regression error terms (31). Estimates of the policy reaction function for
the members are very similar to Bhattacharjee and Holly (2009a, 2009b)
and not discussed here. Similar to the previous papers, we …nd evidence of
substantial heterogeneity in the estimated policy rules. This indicates that
monetary policy decision making within a committee is more complicated
than what can be inferred from an analysis of simple aggregate decisions
undertaken in the literature.
Furthermore, as in Bhattacharjee and Holly (2009b), the error correla-
tions across members are very large, implying therefore that there is sub-
stantial interaction between the decision making processes of the members.
This interaction is over and above what can be explained by the rather exten-
sive set of explanatory variables included in our empirical model of individual
decision making (30). We estimate the interaction weights by GMM, under
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the exogenous censoring interval assumption, and using instruments derived
from residuals for other ( ¡ ) members of the committee and lagged
residuals of members included in the analysis (from lag 2 backwards). In the
spirit of dynamic panel GMM estimators (Arellano and Bond, 1991; Blun-
dell and Bond, 1998), the instrument set is therefore di¤erent for each month
under analysis, re‡ecting the evolving membership of the Committee. The
endogenous error models for each member are estimated separately, though
the entire estimation exercise can be combined together within an uni…ed
GMM setup. The estimated interaction matrix is presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Estimated Cross Member Network Interaction Matrix
George Clementi King Buiter Julius Row SS -stat.
George 0 0813¤¤
(0031)
0184¤¤
(0057)
¡0008
(0061)
¡0149¤
(0061)
0717 909
(=077)
Clementi 0911¤¤
(0061)
0 ¡0081
(0073)
0173¤¤
(0055)
0159¤¤
(0057)
0892 1012
(=068)
King 0532¤¤
(0172)
¡0283
(0216)
0 0610¤¤
(0127)
0540¤¤
(0120)
1027 767
(=086)
Buiter ¡0153
(0277)
0352
(0233)
0680¤¤
(0132)
0 ¡0454¤¤
(0067)
0816 1136
(=058)
Julius ¡0427¤¤
(0086)
0481¤¤
(0121)
0501¤¤
(0072)
¡0340¤¤
(0085)
0 0780 1092
(=062)
¤¤ , ¤and +– Signi…cant at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
HAC standard errors in parentheses.
The moment conditions are validated by the Sargan-Hansen -test (Hansen,
1982) for each equation. Several important observations can be drawn from
the estimates. First, while most (though not all) of the signi…cant links
between members are strong (that is, they run both ways), the interaction
weights matrix is far from symmetric. While Buiter a¤ects the decisions of
Clementi signi…cantly, the opposite is not true. Asymmetry is most obvi-
ous for the strong in‡uences running from George to King and Julius, while
interactions in the opposite direction (though signi…cant) are not as large.
Second, some network weights are not signi…cant either way. Speci…c exam-
ples are between George and Buiter, and between Clementi and King. This
points to important constraints on information sharing within the commit-
tee. Third, some interaction weights are negative. Prominent examples are
between Julius on the one hand and George and Buiter on the other. At
the same time, a graphical representation of the network structure (Figure
2) clearly shows that most of the interactions within these members involve
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Figure 1:
Julius; in other words, she is most centrally located. Fourth, and perhaps
unsurprisingly, the internal members are more in‡uential within the com-
mittee, and George (the Governor) is the most in‡uential of all. Here, we
measure in‡uence by the sum of squares of signi…cant network weights con-
necting to a member. Sixth, contrary to what is predicted in theoretical
models of networks, neither the star network nor a cycle have emerged as the
network architecture here. This was formally tested using a LR test, which
rejected the null of a star network (and a cycle network) at the 1% level of
signi…cance.
The above observations point to the usefulness of the methods proposed
in this paper. They also point to important institutional features which
may be important in developing political economy and network theories of
interactions within a monetary policy committee in the …rst instance, and
also possibly within committees in general.
Finally, the estimates are numerically, and de…nitely in sign, similar to
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estimates of spatial weights reported in Bhattacharjee and Holly (2009b). In
the other paper, the weights were estimated using certain structural restric-
tions on the weights matrix, using methodology developed in Bhattacharjee
and Jensen-Butler (2005).18 At the same time, signi…cance of some of the
weights are di¤erent. Admittedly, such structural restrictions on the weights
matrix can be quite strong and violated in empirical applications. This ob-
servation further underscores the usefulness of the methods proposed here.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we proposed estimation and inference on interaction weights in
social networks and committees. Our method is based on GMM, and based
on moment conditions motivated by the literature on dynamic panel data
models. We place special emphasis on interval censored regression. Both
aspects of the addressed problem are hard. First, estimation in censored
regression models is di¢cult except under very strong assumptions. While
assumptions may be strong in some applications, we also point out alter-
native sets of assumptions and alternative ways to proceed in such cases.
Second, estimation of interaction weights is also di¢cult and, as shown in
Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler (2005), a partially identi…ed problem. Ex-
isting estimation methods in Bhattacharjee and Jensen-Butler (2005) and
Pesaran and Tosetti (2007) placed strong restrictions on the structure of
the weights matrix, which we do not. At the same time, we make assump-
tions on moment conditions, and largely for simplicity, also on the nature of
endogeneity and on the distribution of the error terms. Which of these ap-
proaches contributes to more credible inferences is a question which is partly
application-speci…c, and partly to be addressed through simulations.
An important advantage of the proposed methods is that they are simple
to implement, and as our application to interactions within a monetary policy
committee shows, they also contribute to very useful inferences. Speci…cally,
our empirical study of voting behaviour within the Bank of England’s MPC
provides good support for the above method as well as our theoretical model,
and uncovers new evidence on the process of monetary policy decision mak-
18Speci…cally, Bhattacharjee and Holly (2009b) assumed that: (a) sum of squares for
each row was unity (row standardisation), (b) idiosyncratic error variances for the equa-
tions corresponding to the 3 internal members were equal (partial homoscedasticity), and
(c) interactions between the internal members were symmetric (partial symmetry).
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ing. In particular, we provide more extensive evidence on the strength and
nature of cross-member interactions and provide valuable insights into the
process of decision making within the MPC. The evidence of strong inter-
actions found here requires further examination within the context of an
appropriate theory on incentives and strategic behaviour within a monetary
policy committee. The emerging theoretical literature in this area may pro-
vide interesting new insights on this aspect.
Our empirical application also contributes towards understanding the
process of network formation in a committee setting. The emerging and
very active theoretical literature provides additional insights into the sta-
bility of di¤erent network architectures under assumptions on information
sharing and bargaining. Empirical insights using our proposed methods can
help in understanding these issues more fully.
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